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I. INTRODUCrION
This paper will attempt to survey most of the important trading
arrangements and treaties governing the expanding interdependence
among the nations of the Latin American region and the United States.
It will focus on the current mechanisms for the resolution of trade dis-
putes between governments and will describe a clear evolution toward
more binding and impartial systems which will help to accelerate the
pace of reform and integration.'
The basic method for the resolution of trade disputes between na-
tions is the use of consultations, negotiations, and political persuasion, in
the absence of any agreement establishing a separate or alternative dis-
pute settlement mechanism.2 The intractable nature of many of these
disputes and the inability to negotiate settlements has led to the develop-
ment of several third-party mechanisms including mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, referral to multilateral bodies, or more formal adjudication.3
The international trading system is based to a large extent upon the
The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the United States Department of Commerce or any other agency. The
authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Rachel Shub, Tamara Balch, Michaelle
Burstin, and Carrie Clark in the development of this article.
- U.S. Secretary, NAFTA Secretariat, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
B.A., 1976, University of California at Santa Barbara; J.D., 1979, University of Arkansas. Admit-
ted to Arkansas Bar.
"" Former Trade and Taxation Legislative Counsel, Congressman Raymond J. McGrath, Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. B.A. (magna cum
laude), 1979; M.B.A., 1981, Hofstra University; J.D., 1990. University of Tennessee.
' This paper will not discuss the institutional and treaty framework for the resolution of
commercial disputes. For information on the resolution of commercial disputes, see generally
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LrIGATON AND ARBITRATION (1993); BARRY E.
CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 253-409 (1991); and Daniel M. Kolkey,
Reflections on the U.S. Statutory Framework for International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope,
its Shortcomings, and the Advantages of U.S. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 491 (1991).
2 JEANNE J. GRIMMEiT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT UNDER
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE GATr, 1 (1993) [hereinafter CRS].
3 Id.
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rules developed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).4 The United States, Canada, Brazil, and Chile were original
contracting parties to the GATT and many Latin American and Caribbe-
an nations have undertaken the necessary commitments to accede to the
treaty since 1948.5 The GATT provides the fundamental mechanisms
common to many nations in the Western Hemisphere for resolving trade
disputes and therefore provides the context or framework for comparison
with other trade agreements affecting the region. The improvements con-
tained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the Uruguay
Round will enhance this current framework.
This comparison of trade agreements and dispute settlement mecha-
nisms is important because Latin American and Caribbean nations are
undergoing rapid political and economic transformations. In recent years,
most governments in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have
made remarkable strides to open their economies and establish democrat-
ic institutions. The changes in LAC economic policies coincide with a
renewed United States interest in increasing exports and investment in
the area. The LAC region is of major economic significance to U.S.
commercial interests. With an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in 1991 of $800 billion, the LAC region's economy is larger than the
entire Southeast Asian market, over 60 percent greater than that of Can-
ada (the number one U.S. export market) and more than three times
larger than that of Eastern and Central Europe.6 In 1991, U.S. exports
to this region totaled $62 billion, while imports into the United States
totaled $61.8 billion.' Recent evidence indicates regional and two-way
trade in the LAC region is expanding rapidly as barriers to free trade
are removed.8 These developments have precipitated the negotiation and
implementation of several agreements aimed at furthering the integration
of trade and economic issues among the nations of the region, and, in
some cases, improved dispute settlement mechanisms.
The negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) between Mexico, Canada, and the United States9 has been
4 JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOM-
IC RELATIONS (1986 & Supp. 1992) (offers an excellent overview of the GATT).
' See id. at 64. Of the 115 Contracting Parties to the GATT, as of January 6, 1994, 27 are
from the Western Hemisphere. Office of Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce,
GATT Membership, URu. ROUND UPDATE, Jan. 1994, at 23.
6 Statistics are drawn from the U.S. Department of Commerce publication, ENTERPRISE FOR
THE AMERICAS FACT SHEET, SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE, (Sept. 15, 1992) [hereinafter EAI brochure].
7 Id.
' James Brooke, Latin America's Regional Trade Boon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1993, at DI.
9 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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considered the first major step toward the achievement of a hemispheric
system of free trade." The Agreement, signed on December 17, 1992,
by the Presidents of Mexico and the United States, and the Prime Min-
ister of Canada, is a landmark attempt to remove barriers to free trade
and expand markets on a continental basis." The NAFTA, which en-
tered into force on January 1, 1994, contains dispute settlement provi-
sions which are modeled on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA),t2 but improves on the FTA systems in several ways. It is
appropriate to review the dispute settlement experience under FTA and
how that may apply to the NAFTA because these two agreements offer
significant flexibility to the governments in resolving disputes and estab-
lish rigorous arbitral or quasi-judicial procedures for intractable disputes.
These mechanisms may be ultimately applied to other nations in the
region if LAC governments undertake an achievable series of reforms in
order to receive a significant set of benefits through the possible negoti-
ation of a hemispheric free trade agreement over the next decade.
The Bush Administration undertook to expand and improve the
trade regime in the region through the Enterprise for the Americas Ini-
tiative (EAI).t3 The ultimate goal of the initiative is the conclusion of
various bilateral and plurilateral agreements "to establish a free trade
zone from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego."' 4 The EAI initiative led to
the negotiation of "framework agreements" on trade and investment with
most countries in the Western Hemisphere. The framework agreements
provide a means to monitor trade and investment relations, hold consul-
tations on specific issues, and work toward removing impediments to
trade and investment flows. President Clinton has made positive pro-
nouncements about the negotiation of further trade agreements with the
nations of the region.'5
Based upon a review of all of these agreements affecting trade in
the region, one can conclude that there is discernable progress and
movement by many of the governments to supplement or improve upon
the mechanisms of negotiations and consultations by adding more formal
third-party dispute settlement mechanisms. A closer examination of how
these mechanisms operate may shed some light on how future agree-
10 1992 TRADE POLICY AGENDA OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE
AGREEIENT PROGRAMt 68-69 (available from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
n See id.; NAFTA, supra note 9 at 1-1.
12 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §
2112 (West Supp. 1993) [hereinafter FTA].
"3 EAI brochure, supra note 6.
14 Id.
S President-Elect Clinton and Mexican President Carlos Salinas, Press Conference at Austin,
Texas (Jan. 8, 1993) (transcript on file at Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).
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ments will develop.
I. GATr AND THE URUGUAY ROUND
A. Historical Background
The point of departure for this exploration of trade dispute settle-
ment must be the GATT. It is the most important multilateral trade
agreement aimed at expanding international trade as a means of raising
world welfare.'6 The term GATT also refers to the international organi-
zation that has been created to administer the agreement." GATT rules
reduce uncertainty in connection with commercial transactions across
national borders by ensuring that exports from one country will be treat-
ed the same as goods produced in the importing country (non-discrimi-
nation and national treatment) and that GATT members will accord each
other the most advantageous treatment for trade in goods as that accord-
ed to any nation, most favored nation (MFN) treatment. 8
As of January 6, 1994, 115 countries accounting for approximately
95 percent of world trade are contracting parties to GATT and some 29
additional countries associated with GATT benefit from the application
of its provisions to their trade. 9 The agreement provides a framework
within which international negotiations, known as "Rounds," are con-
ducted to "create a package of reciprocal trade concessions from which
all contracting parties feel they receive some benefit,"" such as the
lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. It also provides for a
consultative mechanism and a panel arbitration process that may be
invoked by governments seeking to protect their trade interests.2'
Article II of the GATT contains the basic tariff obligations of the
contracting parties and serves as the starting point for analysis of the
GATT.' Each party agrees to charge a tariff which is lower than or
equal to the amount specified in its schedule.' To enforce the basic
tariff commitment, article I requires each contracting party to provide
MFN treatment to all other GATT members, e.g. each contracting party
will treat every other contracting party at least as well as it treats any
16 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter,
GATT].
"7 Id. art. XXIX. See also, JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 293.
,8 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 483.
9 Office of Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 5, at 23.
'0 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 494.
21 GATT, supra note 16, art. XXIII.
" Id. art. II.
23 Id.; JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 395-96.
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other government with regard to imports and exports of goods.24
Another central principle of the GATT is the national treatment
obligation of article I which provides for internal taxation and regula-
tory treatment for imports from GATT members at least equal to the
treatment of domestic goods.'
The Tokyo Round of negotiations, from 1973 to 1979, focused on
reducing the impact of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on international trade,
which had become more important as tariffs had fallen. The Tokyo
Round resulted in the issuance of a series of "Codes" regulating govern-
ment actions involving subsidies, government procurement, customs
valuation methods, technical barriers to trade, antidumping and counter-
vailing duties, import licensing, aircraft sales, and the framework of the
GATT.' These "NTBs are less quantifiable, and reductions in them are
more complex to negotiate than reductions in tariffs."'2
In response to changing world conditions, the recognition of the
need to improve the institutional framework (including the mechanisms
for the resolution of disputes), and the desire to expand GATT disci-
plines to financial services (such as banking, insurance, and law), for-
eign investment, intellectual property rights (such as patents, trademarks,
and copyrights),' and barriers to trade in agriculture and textiles, the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was initiated in Sep-
tember 1986.29
Originally planned to conclude by the end of 1990, and then by the
end of 1992, the negotiations stalled over several major issues, the most
divisive being agricultural subsidies, intellectual property rights, financial
services, tariffs, and market access.3" The participants were able to
reach a series of interim agreements in April 1989 as a result of a re-
view of the progress of the negotiations.3'
' GATT, supra note 16, art. I; JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 395.
25 GATT, supra note 16, art. HI; JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 483-84.
26 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 325-26. See also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra
note 1, at 493-99.
" CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 494.
28 Id.
" Id. at 495. For a concise summary of the Uruguay Round, see JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 4, Supp. at 3. For information on the current status of the negotiations, see GATT, News of
the Uruguay Round; BNA. International Trade Reporter (published from July 4, 1984- );
GAT, GAIT Focus; Office of Mulitilateral Affairs, U.S. Department of Commerce, Uruguay
Round Update; and other periodicals concerning international trade.
' CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 495.
3, GAT, Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, GAT Focus,
May 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1023 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Mid-Term]. See also JOHN
H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYsTEM, (1990).
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The successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round on December 15,
1993,32 will significantly alter the legal and institutional framework for
the conduct of trade globally and in the hemisphere, since many Latin
American and Caribbean governments have been active participants in
the Uruguay Round.33
B. GATT Dispute Settlement
One of the incentives for the launching of the Uruguay Round was
general dissatisfaction with the dispute settlement mechanisms.' The
primary means for settling differences in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the agreement are consultations between affected parties under
article XXII.35 Pursuant to the current procedures, which were clarified
during the Tokyo Round and were substantially amended by the mid-
term review of 1989,36 contracting parties resort first to consultations
and conciliation to resolve questions of nullification or impairment of
benefits under the GATT, whether through violation of the GATT, non-
violation of the GATT, or the existence of any other situation giving
rise to nullification or impairment.37
If the parties cannot resolve the matter through consultations, a
complaining party can request the establishment of a panel. The decision
to form a panel is made by the consensus of the GATT Council, includ-
ing all parties to the dispute. The panel, consisting of three or five
members, receives written submissions from the parties, conducts hear-
ings, meets to deliberate on the information submitted, and drafts a pro-
" Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions. MTN/FA Dec. 15, 1993 [hereinafter Final Act] (final signing scheduled for April 5, 1994.
at Marrakesh, Morocco).
33 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 494.
3 Id. at 497.
' GATT, supra note 16, art. XXII.
3 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
GATT Doc. L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979), reprinted in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 210, 211-14 (26th Supp. 1978-1979) [hereinafter BISD]; Improvements to the GA7T
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, GATT Doc. U.6489 (Apr. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Dis-
pute Settlement Improvements], reprinted in BISD 61-67 (36th Supp. 1988-1989) (applied on a
trial basis); Uruguay Round Mid-Term, supra note 31, at 1031 (1989). See also Ronald A.
Brand, Private Parties and GA7T Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel Report on Sec-
tion 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1990); Jeffrey M. Waincymer,
GA7T Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 81 (1989).
" See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 33-
43 (1975). See generally PURRE PESCATORE ET AL., HANDBOOK OF GAIT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
(1992).
536 [Vol. 25:531
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
posed report, with the assistance of the GATT Secretariat.3
Many disputes are resolved through negotiations, but if no solution
is forthcoming, the panel's report is circulated and considered at a meet-
ing of the GATT Council, which decides by consensus, including the
disputing parties, whether to adopt the panel's report and recommenda-
tions. If the report is adopted, the burden is on the defendant party to
either comply with the panel's recommendations or pay compensation to
the complainant party. However, there is no set time frame for a losing
party to come into compliance with the panel's report. The remedies for
non-compliance are referral back to the contracting parties or retaliation
through the suspension of benefits under the agreement, which must be
approved by consensus of the contracting parties.39
The Uruguay Round negotiators have developed improvements to
the GAT dispute settlement rules and procedures which were set forth
in what has become known as the "midterm review."' The "improve-
ments" in the midterm review seek to standardize the procedures for
dispute resolution panels and working parties which are provided for in
articles XXII and XXIII of the GAIT.41 These changes include "seem-
ingly automatic establishment of panels, a stricter regime for appointing
panel members, abandonment of a preference for governmental special-
ists over private individuals as panelists, and deadlines for the dispute
settlement process."42 To address complaints about "long delays in han-
dling complaints," the period from a country's initial request for pro-
ceedings under article XXII or XXIII until the time the GATT Council
makes a decision on the panel report "shall not, unless agreed to by the
parties, exceed fifteen months." The improvements also explicitly rec-
ognize arbitration as an alternative means to the panel process for dis-
pute settlement.43
It is valuable to compare the midterm review provisions and those
proposed for disputes under agreements incorporated in the Final Act.
Such disputes "would be resolved under a common set of procedures
delineated in its 'Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes."'"
The DSU contains dispute settlement provisions which apply to
s JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 337-56, Supp. at 20.
See id. at 337-55; GAIT, supra note 16, art. XXIII.
, Dispute Settlement Improvements, supra note 36, at 61-67; see also Uruguay Round Mid-
Tern, supra note 31.
4' GATT, supra note 16, arts. XXII-XXIII.
CRS, supra note 2.
4 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 497.
4 MTNIFA, 1-A2, Dec. 15, 1993 [hereinafter DSU]. See generally CRS, supra note 2.
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disputes brought under Uruguay Round agreements.45 While allegations
must be based on GATT article XXm:1, more specific dispute settle-
ment provisions in individual agreements are to prevail over general
provisions.' Under the DSU, each contracting party undertakes to "ac-
cord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation."" Once a dispute moves from consultation to the settle-
ment stage, strict time limits for each step govern.48 If a request is
made under article XXII:1 or XXIII:I, the contracting party to which
the request is made shall reply to the request in ten days after its re-
ceipt. Consultations are to begin within thirty days. In cases of urgency,
including those which concern perishable goods, efforts will be made to
accelerate the proceedings.49
The disputing parties are encouraged to voluntarily settle the dispute
themselves." Disputants may call upon a third party to use its "good
offices" to assist in resolving any negotiations.5' The DSU also pro-
vides that panels may obtain technical advice from expert review
groups.
52
Expeditious arbitration by mutual consent of the parties is also
encouraged in the DSU.53 The parties shall abide by the arbitration
award, with provision for compensation and suspension of concessions
applying to such awards.'
Both the GATT and the DSU consider the rights of "multiple" and
"third party" complainants, and have created mechanisms for their par-
ticipation in current and past proceedings.55 The DSU also makes a
major change by providing for appeals of panel decisions for matters
involving legal interpretation of the GATT, and issues of law covered in
panel reports.5 6
The Dunkel Draft provides two automatic remedies for non-compli-
ance: referral back to the contracting parties, or retaliation through the
, DSU, supra note 44, at 1.1.
46 Id. at 1.2. See also Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello. GATT Dispute Settlement
Agreement: Internationalization or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAw. 795 (1992).
' DSU, supra note 44, at 4.2.
48 Id. app. 3, at 12.
19 Id. at 4.8.
'0 Id. at 3.6.
, Id. at 5.1.
s2 Id. at 13.2, app. 4.
I d. at 25.1.
5' Id. at 22.1; CRS, supra note 2. at 20.
5' DSU, supra note 44, at 9, 10; Dispute Settlement Improvements, supra note 36. at 64-65.
See also CRS, supra note 2, at 14.
5' DSU, supra note 44, at 17.6.
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suspension of benefits under the agreement. While retaliation has only
been applied once, 7 the threat of retaliation can be a credible means to
force the resolution of otherwise intractable trade problems." The DSU
specifically sets forth that the contracting party must first seek to sus-
pend concessions in the same sector as that in which the violation oc-
curs. If this is not practicable or effective, the contracting party may
seek to suspend concessions in other sectors under the same agreement;
and if this not practicable or effective, the contracting party may seek to
suspend concessions under another agreement. 9
C. U.S.- EC Oilseeds Dispute
The longstanding dispute between the United States and the Europe-
an Community (EC) over oilseeds exemplifies the usefulness of a threat
of retaliation. It is also helpful to illustrate the operation of the GATI'
dispute settlement system when two major trading partners and several
smaller economies are represented.
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) char-
acterized the dispute as follows:
On December 16, 1987, the American Soybean Association filed
a petition under Section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974, alleging that
the European Community's oilseed policies were denying the rights and
benefits of the United States under the [GATTI].
On January 5, 1988, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated an
investigation of these practices.
After extensive consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the
United States requested the establishment of a GATT dispute settlement
panel.
The GATT panel found [on December 14,] 1989, that EC oilseed
production subsidies impaired benefits accruing to the United States
under the duty-free tariff bindings on oilseeds granted by the EC to the
U.S. under the GATT. The panel recommended that the EC conform
its regulations to the GATT and eliminate the impairment of the tariff
Article XXIII has been applied to suspend concessions when the Netherlands complained
of U.S. dairy import restrictions. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4, at 334. See also Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Doing Unto Others ... The Chicken War Ten Years After, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM.
599 (1973); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Chicken War: A Postscript, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 317
(1974); European Community Restrictions on Imports of United States Specialty Agricultural
Products: Hearings on H.R. 238 and H.R. 320 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, Ist Sess. 95-34, 21 (1977).
' For a commentary on the diminished effectiveness of the threat of unilateral retaliation
under section 301 see Holmer & Bello, supra note 46.
' See generally Final Act, supra note 32; DSU, supra note 44, at 22.3.
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concessions.
On January 25, 1990, the GATT Council of Representatives
adopted the panel report by consensus, and the EC representative con-
firmed the EC's intention to comply with the panel's recommendations.
The EC advised that the necessary measures would be effective by the
1991 crop year.
The EC failed to take appropriate action for the 1991 crop year.
On May 24, 1991, the EC advised that it would implement the panel's
recommendations in a new oilseeds regime to be adopted by October
31, 1991, and that the reforms would apply to all oilseeds harvested
during 1992 and thereafter.
After reviewing the proposed new regime, the United States con-
cluded that the reforms would not comply with the panel's findings.
The United States then proposed that the original panel be reconvened
to consider whether or not the EC's proposed policy would implement
the panel's findings.
On March 16, 1992, the reconvened panel released its report,
which confirmed that the EC's new regime continues to impair the
duty-free bindings on oilseeds.
The reconvened panel recommended that the Community act ex-
peditiously to remove the impairment by either modifying its new sup-
port system or renegotiating its tariff concessions for oilseeds under
Article XXVIII.
At the April 1992 GATT Council meeting the Community indi-
cated that it was not yet prepared to agree to either course of action.
Therefore, on June 12 the United States published a notice in the Fed-
eral Register asking for public comment on a proposal to increase
duties on imports of EC goods into the United States.
At the June 1992 GATT Council meeting, the EC requested and
received GATT authorization to renegotiate its tariff concessions on
oilseeds under Article XXVIII:4 of the GATT.
The U.S. and the EC met four times under the terms of Article
XXVIII:4. However, the EC failed to tender or accept any offer that
would comply with its GATT obligations or compensate the United
States for the continuing impairment.
At the September 1992 GAIT Council meeting, the EC asked for
a working party to review the Article XXVIII:4 negotiations. The U.S.
and other oilseed exporters rejected the EC proposal because it would
have resulted in further delay with no concrete result. At the same
GATT Council meeting, the United States requested that the EC agree
to binding arbitration to determine the amount of damage caused by
the EC oilseed subsidies. The EC rejected the U.S. proposal.
Following the September GATT Council meeting, the U.S. negoti-
ated intensively with the EC on the oilseeds issue. The EC still had
540 [Vol. 25:531
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not found it possible to offer an acceptable solution.
At the November 4, 1992, GATT Council meeting, the U.S. reit-
erated its request for binding arbitration on the amount of damage and
the EC did not respond favorably. The U.S. sought authorization by
the GATT for a withdrawal of concessions ... but the EC did not
support a consensus in favor of such authorization.
The United States estimate[d] that the global damage caused by
the EC's policies [was] approximately $2 billion; the U.S. industry
loses approximated nearly $1 billion annually. The EC's estimate of
global damage [was] less than $400 million.'
The USTR compiled a list of EC products which were to have
increased duties imposed upon them. This list initially totaled approx-
imately $2 billion, with the list to be reduced to $1 billion, for the im-
position of increased tariffs on or after December 5, 1992.61 The list
consisted of products in the same oilseed sector as well as wine, per-
fume, tires, paper products, ceramic tiles, glassware, pipes, records,
tapes, and furniture.62
This threat of retaliatory action caused an uproar on both sides of
the Atlantic. For example, the increase in duty on white wine was to be
nearly 200 percent.63 Many U.S. merchants rushed to their congressio-
nal representatives seeking relief. They were advised to testify on the
impact of such increased duties on their respective domestic industries at
public hearings held by USTR, which are required under section 301.'
On November 20, 1992, the U.S. and EC agreed upon a settlement
(the "Blair House Accord") satisfactorily resolving their differences on
oilseeds. The USTR terminated its section 301 violation claim on De-
cember 4, 1992, but will continue to monitor EC compliance with the
terms of the Blair House Accord under section 306.65
Under the Blair House Accord, the U.S. sought to limit the number
of tons of oilseeds that the EC could subsidize, through limiting the
amount of hectares of oilseeds that could be planted. This was in accor-
dance with a solution that was proposed by France.'
" Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press Release, USTR Factsheet: Oil-
seeds, Nov. 5, 1992 [hereinafter Oilseeds Factsheet].
1 Id.
62 Id.
' See USTR, News Release: U.S. to Withdraw Trade Concessions in Oilseeds Dispute with
E.C., Nov. 5, 1992 [hereinafter Oilseeds News Release].
"Id.
" See Frances Williams, EC Near Oilseeds Accords With Small Exporters, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
4, 1992, (World Trade News) at 7.
6 Id.
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It is interesting to note that Brazil and Canada also made submis-
sions in the dispute. Brazil asserted, "that for foreign competitors the
Community market had shrunk because of increased EEC production
encouraged by subsidies' and that exporters faced artificial disadvantages
in relation to domestic producers because of the preferential absorption
of their output."'67 Canada stated that their rapeseed market was impact-
ed by EEC subsidies, particularly of oil and meal producers. European
end-users of rapeseed were dependent on domestically produced rapeseed
purchases to qualify for the subsidy. Canada asserted that this practice
was clearly inconsistent with national treatment obligations under article
1:4 of the GATT.6"
The relative economic and political size of the contracting party
opponents in a GATT dispute is an important factor when reviewing
how dispute settlement mechanisms affect Latin American and Caribbean
countries. In the oilseeds dispute, the final agreement reached by the
U.S. and the EC differed substantially from the opening positions of
either disputant. The smaller countries involved in the matter have not
concluded GATT article XXVIII compensation negotiations with the EC.
D. Australia-U.S. Sugar Dispute
An example of a GATT dispute settlement involving a large econo-
my and several smaller economies will illustrate another typical situation
involving LAC governments. In June 1988 Australia held consultations
with the U.S. in regard to its restrictions on imports of sugar, particular-
ly for the purpose of establishing the United States' justification under
GATT for its current sugar import regime.69 Argentina, Brazil, Colom-
bia, and Nicaragua were among the "interested third parties" that made
submissions to the panel.7" The facts of the dispute were as follows:
In 1949, the United States negotiated and included in schedule XX
tariff concessions on raw and refined sugar subject to a provision relat-
ing to title II of the Sugar Act of 1948 (Sugar Act) or substantially
equivalent legislation.7 Title II of the Sugar Act required the Secretary
of Agriculture "to establish quotas on the importation and domestic
production of sugar on the basis of his yearly determination of the
amount of sugar needed to meet consumers' requirements in the conti-
6' GATr, Canada/European Communities Article XXVII Rights, GATT Doc. DS12/R, (Oct.
16, 1990), reprinted in BISD 80, 121 (37th Supp. 1989-90) (awarded by the Arbitrator).
6' Id. at 122.
69 United States Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, GATT Doc. IU6514 (June 22, 1989). re-
printed in BISD 331 (36th Supp. 1988-1989).
I' d. at 338-41.
7' Id. at 332.
542 [Vol. 25:531
19931 TRADE AGREEMENTS AND DISPUTE SE7TLEMENT 543
nental United States."72
This provision was "enlarged to authorize the President of the Unit-
ed States to proclaim a rate of duty and quota limitation on imported
sugars if the Sugar Act or substantially equivalent legislation should ex-
pire .. . ."' The Sugar Act expired in 1974, and was not replaced
with substantially equivalent legislation.74 Instead, the President, by
proclamation, established an import quota program which was reestab-
lished in 1982, whereby the size of the global import quota was "allo-
cated between the different supplying countries according to their past
performance during a previous representative period."'75 Australia's mar-
ket share of the total U.S. import sugar market declined from 8.3 per-
cent in 1982 to 7.9 percent in 1988.76 The primary arguments of the
Parties were summarized as follows:
Australia asked the Panel to find that the import restrictions on
sugar implemented by the United States were contrary to the provisions
of Article XI:1 and qualified neither for the exceptions provided for
under that Article, nor for those provided under any other relevant
provision of the General Agreement and also that these restrictions
constituted, prima facie, a case of nullification or impairment of
Australia's rights under the General Agreement. Australia noted that
the United States did not justify these restrictions in terms of Section
22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 1933) as amended, or any
other measure. Specifically, Australia noted that the Section 22 Waiver
did not permit the imposition of fees and quotas simultaneously, nor
did it permit quotas to be set at less than 50 percent of the level of
imports during a previous representative period ....
The United States maintained that the import restrictions subject
to Australia's complaint were administered pursuant to a negotiated
tariff concession, and thus pursuant to provisions which were an inte-
gral part of the General Agreement. On this basis, the United States
asked the Panel to reject Australia's complaint.7
Argentina and Brazil argued that the basic purpose of the conces-
sions granted to the United States were to create stable conditions of
competition, primarily aimed at alleviating an emergency situation creat-
2 Id.
7 Id.
'4 Id. at 333.
75 id.
76 Id.
'n Id. at 334 (abstracts of the primary arguments of Australia and the U.S. appear in their
entirety).
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ed by the instability of world market prices." Argentina lost nearly
$200 million annually from 1981-1987, while Brazil's decline in exports
of sugar to the United States went from 1 million short tons in the early
80's to 15,300 short tons in 1988."9
Colombia blamed the restrictive quotas for the impairment it suf-
fered in the world sugar market." Nicaragua concurred with Australia's
argument that the United States' actions constituted a restriction within
the terms of article XI:1, and that the value and scope of the United
States' concessions could be viewed as an outright prohibition of sugar
imports."'
Canada made a submission to the dispute, asserting that it suffered
a nearly 66 percent drop in sugar exports to the U.S. as a result of the
duties and quotas program.82 "Canada argued that these restrictions
were contrary to Article XI and could not be justified under paragraph 2
of the Article," 3 which allowed a combination of duties and quotas,
and thereby was inconsistent with the General Agreement.
The panel found that the United States could not justify the mainte-
nance of quantitative restrictions on the importation of certain sugars
inconsistent with the application of article XI:1.' The panel recom-
mended that the contracting parties request that the U.S. either terminate
these restrictions or bring them into conformity with the General Agree-
ment. 5
71 Id. at 338-39.
79 Id.
8 Id. at 340.
RI Id. at 340-41. Professor Carter asserts that "difficult disputes often arise from the use of
import (or other trade) controls for foreign policy purposes, such as the U.S. cutoff of the Nica-
raguan sugar quota [for imports into the United States in 1983]."
"I Id. at 339.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 341-44.
SS For another example of large country versus small country GATT litigation, see United
States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances GATr, Doc. L16175, (June 17,
1987), reprinted in BISD 136 (34th Supp. 1986-1987) (report of the Panel). Professor Jackson
summarized the results of this case as follows:
In 1986, the United States adopted a tax on petroleum for the purpose
of financing pollution control measures, i.e. the so-called superfund for
cleanup of waste disposal sites. The tax was set at 11.7 cents per barrel of
imported oil and 8.2 cents per barrel of domestically produced oil. (The
House of Representatives had originally proposed taxing oil at a higher rate
than the Senate was willing to accept. The compromise was to tax only im-
ported oil at the higher rate.) Following complaints by a number of coun-
tries, a GATI dispute settlement panel was established and concluded that
the tax violated GATT's National Treatment Clause. However, the panel
upheld a levy on imported products made from chemicals that would have
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Professor Carter addresses the problems of the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the GATT.86 This analysis is particularly useful when
applying the dispute settlement mechanisms to Latin American countries.
He states:
For an injured country, an even greater problem than the slow
procedures is the relief available under GATT. The Contracting Parties
are likely at most to authorize the injured party under Article XXIII to
suspend the concessions it has granted the other country or suspend
other obligations owed that country. This relief is limited, particularly
when a country imposing the sanctions is willing to absorb some costs
to carry out its foreign policy. The situation is especially unsatisfactory
when the target country is much smaller that the country imposing the
sanctions, because the small country's retaliation is unlikely to have
any significant effect on the large country. For example, even if Nica-
ragua had been authorized to suspend offsetting concessions to the
United States after the U.S. action on the sugar quota, this retaliation
would have had an infinitesimal impact on the United States. Indeed,
the United States itself later decided to cut off exports to, as well as
imports from, Nicaragua.'
The General Agreement reflects the need for contracting parties to a
dispute to determine the most just and efficient manner to settle it. The
Dunkel Draft addresses many of the weaknesses in the present system.
Presently, the contracting parties must adopt a panel report unanimously,
which affords offending parties the option of blocking panel reports.88
The Dunkel Draft allows the report to go into effect automatically, or
the contracting parties must vote unanimously not to adopt the report.89
The limited ability of countries to enforce recommendations against
other GATT members is addressed in the Dunkel Draft, which, "pro-
vides for automatic authorization to retaliate where the offending con-
tracting party falls to implement a panel report in an agreed 'reasonable
been subject to a tax in the United States on the grounds that the levy was
a border tax adjustment permitted by GATT. The United States accepted the
panel report and Congress set a uniform rate of 9.7 cents per barrel in the
Steel Trade Liberalization Program Implementation Act, section 8, 103 Stat.
1891 (1989).
t CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 497. See also PFSCATORE, supra note 37. See gen-
erally HUDEC, supra note 37, at 33-43.
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 497.
s CRS supra note 2, at 20-21.
SId.
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period' of time."' The Dunkel Draft also provides clearer timetables to
alleviate the concerns about the current lack of established deadlines.
When the final Uruguay Round text is approved and implemented, it
will provide an objective, enforceable mechanism substantially better
than that available today under the current agreement, which should lead
to reduced trade tensions and more efficient handling of disputes.
I. LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN EcONOMIC
INTEGRATION EFFORTS
The governments of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have
been pursuing economic integration in the region for many years. These
efforts have accelerated recently due to the increased participation of
LAC governments in the Uruguay Round, the recognition that trade
restrictions can inhibit economic growth, and the stated U.S. interest in
establishing a hemispheric free trade arrangement.9' A brief overview of
some of the most important regional trade agreements and their dispute
settlement provisions will provide some insight into the direction these
integration efforts are taking.92
A. ALADI
In August 1980, ten nations of South America and Mexico signed
the Treaty of Montevido,93 which created the Latin American Integra-
tion Association (ALADI). This organization replaced the Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association.94 The Montevideo Treaty's main purpose is
to promote regional and subregional partial tariff preference agreements
as a means to eventual multilateralization of mutual concessions.95 Over
90 Id.
9 Eduardo Gitli & Gunilla Ryd, Latin American Integration and the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 25, 31 (1992).
92 Due to the paucity of English language information on many of these agreements and ar-
rangements, there may be some details which are omitted or mischaracterized in this section.
9' Treaty of Montevido Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12,
1980, 20 I.L.M. 672 (entered into force Mar. 18, 1981) [hereinafter Treaty of Montevido].
' Report of Activities of the American Free Trade Association up to 31 December 1964,
GAIT Doc. I_2370 (Mar. 8, 1965), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 682; Program for Economic
Complementarity and Integration, Res. 100 (IV), L.A.F.T.A. Doc. ALALC/ResoIuti6n 100 (IV)
(Dec. 8, 1964), reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 761; Final Act and Resolution of Meeting of Foreign Min-
isters of Latin American Free Trade Association Countries, L.A.F.T.A. Doc. ALALC/RMIIActa
Final (Nov. 6, 1965), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 125; ALALC, Protocol Establishing the Final Mech-
anism for the Settlement of Disputes with LAFTA, SINTESs MENSUAL, Oct. 1967, reprinted in 7
I.L.M. 747; General Regulations Applicable to the Subregional Agreements Within LAFTA, Res.
222 (VII), L.A.F.T.A. Doc. ALALC/ Resoluci6n 222 (VII) (Dec. 17, 1967), reprinted in 7 I.L.M.
851.
9, Gitli & Ryd, supra note 91.
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100 such subagreements, known as "partial scope agreements," have
been signed under ALADI.
The treaty creates an elaborate institutional framework with a Coun-
cil of Foreign Ministers (Council); a Conference of Evaluation and Con-
vergence (Conference), composed of plenipotentiaries; a Committee of
Representatives (Committee), composed of permanent delegates; and a
General Secretariat. The Council has some responsibility to hear and
resolve matters referred to it by the other bodies, but dispute resolution
specifically is mentioned only in the context of one of the functions of
the Committee: to "propose formulas for resolving matters presented by
the member countries, when it is alleged that some of the norms or
principles of this Treaty are not being observed .... "96 Regional and
subregional agreements in the Americas have followed this pattern, with
primary emphasis on tariff preferences, leaving settlement of disputes to
resolution at a political level. With the promise of a hemispheric free
trade area, steps to deepen integration within the ALADI framework
have accelerated in the last few years. Many of the other agreements
mentioned below specifically reference the treaty, although it has be-
come somewhat cumbersome to operate within as the number of agree-
ments has proliferated.97
B. MERCOSUR
On March 26, 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
formed the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) through the Treaty
of Asunci6n," which was ratified within seven months. Potentially the
most far-reaching of all the ALADI agreements, the treaty sets the ambi-
tious goal of establishing a customs union and common market by the
end of 1995. This proposal has the potential to create the largest mar-
ket in Latin America, approximately half the total economy in South
America."0
MERCOSUR's goals go beyond the tariff preference agreements
characteristic of previous Latin American integration schemes. It aims at
the free circulation of goods, services, financial services, and workers
among all the parties. In addition, members will coordinate macroecono-
mic and sectoral policies regarding exchange rates, trade, agriculture,
transportation, and communications.
9 Treaty of Montevido, supra note 93, art. 35(m).
Gitli & Ryd, supra note 91.
Treaty of Asunci6n, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.- Braz.- Para.- Uru., 30 I.L.M. 1041.
9 Id. art. 1.
"0 Brooke, supra note 8.
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The principal commitments concerning the trade in goods undertak-
en by the MERCOSUR governments include the reduction (to zero) of
import duties for goods of the other parties by the end of 1994210 In
the meantime, members are reducing import duties every six months
according to a negotiated schedule that began on January 1, 1992 with a
47 percent reduction. Each member has a list of exceptions to the reduc-
tion of barriers, which will be reduced by 20 percent annually until
eliminated in 1995. Another goal is to establish a .common external
tariff of about 35 percent by December 31, 1994 and to develop a new
common rule of origin, under which an article will qualify as a
MERCOSUR product if more than 50 percent of its value originates
within MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR has shown early signs of success;
trade between Brazil and Argentina jumped 50 percent in 1991."°
The institutional framework for MERCOSUR is headed by a Coun-
cil of the Common Market which will provide political leadership and
make decisions concerning the implementation and evolution of the
common market."0 3 A Common Market Group will monitor the imple-
mentation of the accord and enforce Council decisions. The trading part-
ners will coordinate macroeconomic and sectoral policies regarding ex-
change rates, trade, agriculture, transportation, and communications.
Annex I of the Asunci6n Treaty pertains to dispute settlement. It
provides for direct negotiations between parties to resolve disputes be-
fore they are referred to the Common Market Group."l If referred to
that body, it must issue a report within 60 days of the referral, including
any technical or expert advice." If no resolution can be made at that
level, the issue can be escalated to the Council of Ministers. This annex
provides for a new system to be proposed and adopted before
December 31, 1994.t" On December 17, 1991, a Protocol was exe-
cuted for the settlement of these disputes through arbitration."° It is
useful to note that the primary mechanism for dispute resolution under
MERCOSUR remains negotiation and consultation, but the addition of
the new avenues of referral to the Common Market Group or to ar-
bitration offer the possibility of more objective and efficient decisions if
the mechanisms are utilized. It is too early to tell whether or not these
101 Id.
102 id.
103 Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 98, art. 9.
'o Id. annex III, para. 1.
105 Id.
' Brooke, supra note 8.
107 Emilio J. CUdenas, The Treaty of Asuncid6n: A Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR) Begins to Take Shape, WORLD COMPITrION L. & ECON. REv., June 1992, at 65,
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new possibilities will be realized.
C. Andean Pact
The Andean Pact was established in 1969 by the Cartagena Agree-
ment °8 to promote economic integration and trade cooperation and de-
velopment in the Andean countries of Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Boliv-
ia, Ecuador, and Chile."B The Andean Pact is a regional effort to build
upon the commitments made in the LAFTA and ALADI agreements."
The Andean Pact countries have now agreed to almost completely
free intra-regional trade by the end of 1995. The declaration of
Barahona,"' signed in December of 1991, created an intra-Andean free
trade area beginning January 1992 for Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezue-
la, and July 1992 for Ecuador and Peru.
Under the treaty, a common external tariff will apply on the basis
of four tariff levels, 5, 10, 15 and 20 percent, (to be further reduced in
1994)."' Bolivia may maintain its levels of 5 and 10 percent. Tariff
treatment for agricultural products will be defined in the framework of a
common agricultural policy. With respect to automobiles, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela will adopt a common external tariff with a
maximum limit of 40 percent until January 1, 1994, when it will be
reduced to 25 percent, (Colombia has already reduced its tariff to 35
percent). Certain exemptions from the common external tariff will apply
to products not produced in the Andean region.
A joint commercial and industrial policy is aimed at removing all
obstacles to integration by 1995. A directly elected Andean Parliament
with two scheduled summit meetings per year will be created by the
end of 1992." 3 In addition, the Andean Pact governments have
pledged to create a social fund for rural areas and to develop common
approaches to farming, research, cultural, social, and health policy, for-
eign policy, and the fight against narcotrafficking. Finally, the new trade
partners have invited Mexico, Chile, MERCOSUR, and the rest of the
hemisphere to negotiate with the Andean region as a bloc."4
I's See Official Codified Text of the Cartagena Agreement Incorporating the Quito Protocol,
28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
10' U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, GUIDEBOOK TO THE ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE Acr
51 (1992) (Chile withdrew in 1976).
11 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 108, at 1171.
I Id. app. H.
12 Andean Group: Commission Decision 324 - Common External Tariff Liberation Program
and Incentives for Intrasubregional Exports, 32 LL.M. 211 (1993).
3 See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 108.
" See Alberto Arcbalos, Historic Andean Pact in Critical Condition, REUTERS Bus. REP.,
54919931
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L[
A separate treaty created the Court of Justice of the Cartagena
Agreement."5 This court is the highest legal authority for all Andean
Pact matters and enjoys superior jurisdiction to the supreme courts of
the respective members as to these matters. "6 This new system offers
a considerably more rigorous approach to trade dispute settlement than
those previously utilized in Latin America. The authors could find no
cases which have been brought to this body to date. Whether such cases
arise will be a measure of the government's willingness to be bound by
multinational bodies, such as GATT, or a hemispheric free trade ar-
rangement.
D. Caribbean Common Market
The Caribbean Economic Community (Caricom) was established on
August 1, 1973, by the Treaty of Chaguaramas (Trinidad)."7 It is com-
posed of English-speaking Caribbean nations: Antigua; "' the Baha-
mas;1 9  Barbados; 20  Belize;... Grenada;22  Guyana; 23  Jamai-
ca;124  Montserrat;"s St. Kitts-Nevis; 2 6  St. Lucia; 27  St. Vincent"
and the Grenadines; and Trinidad and Tobago. 29 In late 1991, leaders
agreed to a new deadline of January 1, 1994, for creating a customs un-
ion. Meanwhile, the deadline for implementing a common external tariff
has been postponed for failure of some members to implement it. 3°
The common external tariff promises low rates of duty on imports
that do not compete with goods produced within the community, but
Aug. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Ilmtg file.
"' Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, May 28, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1203 (1979) [hereinafter Cartagena Court Treaty]. See also L. Weisenfeld, Introduction to
Agreement Text, 28 I.L.M. 1233 (1989).
16 Cartagena Court Treaty, supra note 115.
"' Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, opened for signature July 4, 1973, 947
U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force Aug. 1, 1973) [hereinafter Caricom].
..8 Antigua, ratified July 4, 1974. Id. at 18.
"' Bahamas, ratified _ Id. (exact ratification date not given).
2 Barbados, ratified July 30, 1973. Id.
2 Belize, ratified April 17, 1974. Id.
'2 Grenada, ratified April 17, 1974. Id.
Guyana, ratified July 28, 1973. Id.
'4 Jamaica, ratified July 31, 1973. Id.
'z Montserrat, ratified April 17, 1974. Id.
126 St. Kitts-Nevis, ratified July 26, 1974. Id.
127 St. Lucia, ratified April 17, 1974. Id.
121 St. Vincent, ratified April 17, 1974. Id.
1 Trinidad & Tobago, ratified July 30, 1973. Id.
120 Unnamed Source, Department of Commerce, Office of Latin America, Caribbean Basin
Division [hereinafter D.O.C. Source].
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sets high rates on any imports likely to injure domestic industry."'
Tariffs will range from 5 percent to 45 percent, replacing a structure
where some tariffs are as high as 70 percent. The Caricom tariff struc-
ture remains significantly higher than that of its rapidly liberalizing
neighbors in the LAC. There are indications that some members of
Caricom may be considering a reduction in the common external tar-
iff.32
Caricom is managed by the Conference of Heads of Government,
the Common Market Council, and a Community Secretariat. The Confer-
ence sets the policies of the community by issuing directives and deci-
sions, entering into treaties for the community, and managing the finan-
cial affairs of the organization. Any disputes over the interpretation or
application of the agreement may be referred to the Council, an ad hoc
tribunal, or the Conference. 33 The Council may enforce its decisions
or those of tribunals by suspending benefits to offending states." This
mechanism is similar to GATT procedures, and will probably share
some of its weaknesses, but it is a clear step beyond mere consultation
and negotiation as a means to obtain redress in trade matters.
E. Central American Common Market
On July 15, 1991, the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua agreed to establish a new Central
American Common Market (CACM).135 This effort supersedes an earli-
er attempt at integration which failed in 1969 due to El Saivador-Hon-
duras hostilities.'36 In addition to the countries already included in the
CACM, Panama is becoming more involved in regional integration ef-
forts and may ultimately join in the CACM, even though it is not his-
torically considered to be part of Central America. 37
The CACM will create new tariff structures, including a common
external tariff ranging from 5-20 percent in 1993. Costa Rica will phase
in the maximum tariff rate in quarterly installments from March 1992 to
June 1993. Over 1700 products will be traded duty-free among the five
countries, comprising approximately 95 percent of all products traded
3 Caricom, supra note 117, art. XIV.
3 D.O.C. Source, supra note 130.
3 Caricom, supra note 117, art. XIV.
"1 Id. art. XI.
' Shelley Emling, Central American Leaders Aim to Build Free Trade Bloc, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, July 17, 1991, at 4.
'3 General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455 U.N.T.S. 3.
See also, EAI brochure, supra note 6.
" D.O.C. Source, supra note 130.
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within the region. Eventually, the CACM partners also seek to establish
free trade in services and the free movement of capital and labor. They
will also establish a forum for consultation on external debt and external
financing.' 38 CACM disputes will be handled by consultation and ne-
gotiation in the absence of any third-party mechanisms or adjudicative
bodies.
F. Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement
On September 22, 1991, the Presidents of Chile and Mexico signed
a "Complementary Economic Agreement."'' This free trade agreement
was entered into within the ALADI framework. 4' Some of its inspira-
tion may be attributable to the prospect of Mexico's entry into a North
American Free Trade Agreement and Chile's interest in accelerating its
own accession to a free trade agreement with the United States.
The agreement will eliminate all tariffs on most goods by January
1, 1996, with tariffs on a small group of sensitive products being phased
down by January 1, 1998. ' All non-tariff barriers will be removed
beginning on January 1, 1992, with the exception of some measures
covered by article 50 of the Treaty of Montevideo, (exceptions for pub-
lic health and safety, war materials, national treasures, etc.)., 42 Both
countries will adopt "open skies" programs for air transportation and
will eliminate sea transport reserve cargoes. 43 The two nations will
accord each other MFN treatment of investments and will sign a double
taxation treaty.' 44
The agreement contains a dispute settlement mechanism that is
unique in Latin American trade agreements. It establishes a Commission
to administer and supervise implementation of its commitments. 45 Arti-
cle 33 provides for consultations about trade disputes before the Com-
mission selects a five-member arbitration panel, composed of two mem-
bers from each disputant and a chairman who is not a national of either
party. The five arbitrators will be guided by such regulations as the
parties agree to, and must render their resolution of the dispute within
13 Id.
"3 Complementary Economic Agreement Sept. 30, 1991 Chile-Mex. (on file at the Mexican
Embassy).
, Treaty of Montevido, supra note 93.
,4' Compleffientary Economic Agreement, supra note 139, art. 3.
142 Id. art. 2.
143 Id. arts. 23-26.
'" Id. arts. 21-22.
,I' Id. art. 33.
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30 days of their selection (extendable by a like period of time). '46 Res-
olution of the dispute can include total or partial withdrawal or suspen-
sion of concessions, with revocation of the agreement for non-compli-
ance as the primary means of enforcement. This mechanism appears to
contain elements similar to the process elaborated in the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement.
G. Mexico-Central American FTA and G-3
Meanwhile, Mexico has initiated negotiations with the Central
American countries aimed at establishing free trade. An agreement to
negotiate was announced recently.'47
Venezuela and Colombia are also accelerating free trade negotia-
tions with Mexico. On June 11, 1992, the Presidents of the so-called
"Group of Three" (G-3) met and announced their commitment to signing
a free trade agreement by the end of 1992. Mexican officials have stat-
ed, however, that Mexico would not sign a G-3 FTA until after comple-
tion of NAFTA.'48 At the same time that G-3 talks are accelerating,
Chile has expressed an interest in entering into bilateral agreements with
each G-3 member.'49
The acceleration of the integration process and increasing intra-re-
gional trade will in all likelihood lead to continuing reduction of trade
barriers. As barriers fall, previously protected sectors in each country, on
the one hand, and truly export-competitive sectors still encountering
trade restrictions in export markets, on the other hand, will bring pres-
sure to bear to seek "political" solutions to trade problems. Long-term
success of these agreements hinges upon whether they yield more objec-
tive, less political dispute settlement procedures resulting in enforceable
decisions which are politically acceptable to the parties.
IV. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The successful negotiation and implementation of the Canada-United
States Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) helped entice Mexico to undertake
economic reforms in order to qualify for preferential trading status under
a similar arrangement. In turn, as discussed below, the promise of a
hemispheric free trade area based upon the FTA and the recently con-
cluded North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has become the
146 id.
117 Digest, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1992, (Financial Section) at F2. See also EAI brochure,
supra note 6.
14 Department of Commerce, Office of Latin America.
149 Id.
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central element of U.S. trade policy in the Western Hemisphere. The
FTA's dispute settlement mechanisms have been included, with some
improvements in the NAFTA. If further trade agreements are concluded
with other nations of the hemisphere then the experience under FTA
will be indicative of what can be expected under NAFTA.
A. Experience Under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
One of the more ambitious initiatives launched under the GATT 0
during the past decade was the negotiation of the FTA. After lengthy
negotiations from 1985 to 1988, and following considerable political
debate in both countries, it entered into force on January 1, 1989.'
The Agreement established a free trade area including all territories of
the United States and Canada, the largest such trading zone at the time.
The FTA is a comprehensive agreement which among other things:
eliminates all tariffs on bilateral goods trade over a ten-year period;
reduces non-tariff trade barriers; establishes principles for the conduct of
bilateral trade in services for the first time in an international agreement;
establishes rules for the conduct of bilateral investment; resolves many
outstanding bilateral trade issues; enhances the national security of the
two countries; facilitates business travel; assures secure energy supplies;
and, establishes an expeditious and effective binational dispute settlement
system.1
52
B. FTA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
Article 1802 of the FTA creates the Canada-United States Trade
Commission (Commission), headed by the cabinet officials responsible
for international trade. The Commission oversees the implementation,
application, and elaboration of the FTA. The Commission is also respon-
sible for the resolution of disputes which arise over the interpretation of
the agreement.'53 The focus in article 1802 is on dispute avoidance
through consultation and negotiation between the parties."M
150 GATT permits contracting parties to form free trade areas or customs unions irrespective
of their MFN obligations, so long as the arrangements cover "substantially all trade" between the
parties. GATT, supra note 15, art. XXIV.
"5 IVAN BERNIER & BENOIT LAPOINTE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED 1 (1990) [hereinafter FTA ANNOTATED].
" See James R. Holbein et al., Comparative Analysis of Specific Elements in United States
and Canadian Unfair Trade Laws, 26 INT'L LAW. 873 (1992); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational
Dispute Under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Ap-
praisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 269.
153 FTA, supra note 12, art. 1802. See also FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151 at 427.
"5 FTA, supra note 12, art. 1807. See also FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 434.
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Article 1807 permits five-member panels of experts to render advi-
sory opinions and recommendations for settlement of disputes referred
by the parties. The parties agree upon the terms of reference, select the
binational panel and chairman, and agree upon a timetable for the con-
duct of the panel review. The parties normally follow the deadlines
established in article 1807 and the procedures outlined in the Model
Rules of Procedure for Chapter 18 Panelst "5 which provide for written
submissions, oral argument, an initial report, comments by the parties,
and a final report, normally within 120 days of the formation of the
panel."5 6 After five years, five disputes have reached the stage of bina-
tional panel review under this article."s
Article 1806 requires binding arbitration of "safeguards" issues
under chapter 11 and permits referral of any other dispute to binding
arbitration, "on such terms as the Commission may adopt."'55 Safe-
guards are measures imposed by one nation to control the flow of im-
ports from another nation or nations which are a cause of substantial
injury to the domestic industry of the importing nation.'59 To date, no
panels have convened under article 1806.
The Binational Secretariat, a unique organization created by article
1909 of the FTA, administers the system of panel review procedures to
settle disputes arising under both chapters 18 and 19 of the agree-
ment.6 The Secretariat has U.S. and Canadian Sections which act as
"mirror-images" of each other. The Secretariat's initial mandate is for
five years, extendable by two years,' pending the development of a
substitute system of rules in both countries for antidumping and counter-
vailing duties as applied to their bilateral trade by a working group on
' Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter 18 Panels; United States - Canada Free Trade
Agreement, 54 Fed. Reg. 14372 (1989).
I ld. at 14373; FTA, supra note 12, art. 1807; FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 434.
m In the matter of: Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review [hereinafter U.S.-Canada
FrA Panel] Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01 (Oct. 16, 1989); In the matter of: Lobsters from Cana-
da, U.S.-Can. FTA Panel, Panel No. USA-89-1807-01 (May 25, 1990); In the matter of: Article
304 and the Definition of Direct Cost of Processing or Direct Cost of Assembling, U.S.-Can.
FTA Panel, Panel No. USA-92-1807-01 (June 8, 1992); In the matter of: The Interpretation of
and Canada's Compliance With Article 701.3 With Respect to Durum Wheat Sales, U.S.-Can.
FTA Panel, Panel No. CDA-92-1807-01 (Feb. 8. 1993); Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import,
Distribution, and Sale of Ultra-High Temperature Milk from Quebec, U.S.-Can. FTA Panel, Panel
No. USA-93-1807-01 (June 3, 1993).
' FTA, supra note 12, art. 1807. See also FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 434.
' JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 4 at 538.
, See exchange of letters between John Crosbie, Canadian Minister for International Trade
and Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 29, 1988 and Jan. 2, 1989) (on file with
the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).
16 FTA, supra note 12, art. 1906. See also FA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 459.
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subsidies created by article 1907.162
Article 1904 provides for review by five-member panels of experts,
primarily lawyers familiar with international trade law, of antidumping
duty (AD), countervailing duty (CVD), and material injury determina-
tions made by one party respecting goods of the other party."" Both
countries retain their respective unfair trade laws and the cases are re-
viewed under the domestic law of the country whose agency made the
determination under review." Agency determinations made as a result
of investigations as well as those made in periodic reviews of existing
AD/CVD orders may be reviewed by binational panels. Detailed guid-
ance for the conduct of these panel reviews is provided in the Article
1904 Panel Rules.' Forty-nine panel reviews have been requested un-
der article 1904.66
As a safeguard against impropriety or gross panel error that could
threaten the integrity of the process, article 1904 also provides for an
"extraordinary challenge procedure."'67 When a Party to the agreement
alleges that:
(a)(i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a
serious conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of
conduct;
ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure,
or
iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction
set forth in this Article, and
b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affect-
ed the panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational
"6 This working group agreed to coordinate efforts in the Subsidies Working Group of the
Uruguay Round as the most effective means to achieve the goal of the FrA. When the Uruguay
Round stalled, the negotiations to create a NAFTA began and the working group focused on the
trilateral aspects of subsidies and dumping. Although the NAFMA does not provide for this work-
ing group, the Free Trade Commission established a new working group on these issues at a
ministerial on January 14, 1994. See INSIDE NAFTA, Jan. 26, 1994, at 10.
"6 PTA, supra note 12, art. 1904. See also, FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151 at 446.
14 FTA, supra note 12, art. 1904; FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 446.
1 Article 1904 Panel Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 53212 (1988), amended in 54 Fed. Reg. 53165
(1989), amended and republished in 57 Fed. Reg. 26698 (1992), amended and republished in 59
Fed. Reg. 5982 (1994).
" Notices of requests for panel review, decisions of panels, and completions of panel review
are published in the Federal Register (published 1936- ) and the Canada Gazette (pub-
lished 1970- ). Full texts of decisions are available from the Binational Secretariat, on some
computer legal services, and in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (James R. Holbein
& Donald J. Musch eds., 1993).
167 FTA, supra note 12, art. 1904.13, annex 1904.13. See also FTA ANNOTATED, supra note
151, at 451, 476.
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panel review process,"6 then the aggrieved Party may appeal a
panel's decision to a three-member committee of Canadian and U.S.
judges or former judges. The committee must make its decision wheth-
er to affirm, remand, or vacate the panel's decision typically within 30
days of its establishment."6
Two Extraordinary Challenge Committees have been established at
this juncture,17 one to review the second panel decision in the matter
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada,' and the other to
review both the May 19, 1992, and the October 30, 1992, panel deci-
sions in the matter of Live Swine from Canada.' In the pork litiga-
tion, the binational panel remanded the U.S. International Trade
Commission's final determination of the existence of a threat of material
injury to the Commission for further action in two successive decisions.
In response to the panel's second decision, the Commission, in a three-
member plurality decision, reversed its earlier affirmative finding and
issued a negative determination.
The United States requested the formation of an Extraordinary
Challenge Committee alleging that the panel had committed five errors
in its decision. The Committee found that the request failed to cross the
threshold for review of panel decisions set out in article 1904 and af-
firmed the panel decision, thereby leaving the negative injury determina-
tion effective. 73
The Request for an Extraordinary Challenge Committee in the
swine litigation was filed on January 21, 1993, alleging that the bina-
tional panel "seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure or
manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction" in four instanc-
es in its two decisions. 74 Subsequently, three of the four grounds for
challenge were dropped. The Committee affirmed the panel decision and
offered several important observations about the appropriate roles for
... FTA, supra note 12, art. 1904.13.
' FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 476.
0 In the matter of: United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review
[hereinafter U.S.-Can. FTA BPR], Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. ECC-
91-1904-01USA (June 14, 1991); In the matter of: U.S.-Can. FTA BPR, Live Swine from Cana-
da, Panel File No. ECC-93-1904-01USA. Copies of the committee decisions are available from
the Binational Secretariat. For an extensive commentary on the pork litigation, see Lowenfeld,
supra note 152, at 302.
"' In the Matter of: Fresh, Chilled, or Frozen Pork from Canada, Panel No. USA-89-1904-
11 (Feb. 12, 1991) (on file at the Binational Secretariat).
'72 In the matter of: Live Swine from Canada, Panel No. USA-91-1904-03 (May 19, 1992 &
Oct. 30, 1992) (on file at the Binational Secretariat).
m U.S.-Can. FTA BPR, supra note 170, at 327.
174 See Live Swine, supra note 172.
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Extraordinary Challenge Committees, binational panels, and the investi-
gating authorities whose determinations are reviewed by panels. 75
The benefits of this unique chapter 19 system for review of
AD/CVD determinations include more rapid review than is typical in
U.S. or Canadian courts and more certainty of results. 7 ' In U.S. and
Canadian court proceedings, the court decision may be appealed to an
appellate court after months or years of litigation, prolonging the period
for which deposits of customs duties are collected and held.'" Under
the FTA, most panels have completed action in less than two years,
including all actions on remand by the administering agencies, and ap-
peal can be made only to Extraordinary Challenge Committees at the re-
quest of one of the parties to the agreement, not one of the participants
in the litigation itself."7 ' This is a significant improvement in the effi-
ciency and speed of dispute settlement. It has also been argued that
binational panels of five experts will frequently bring broad experience
and working knowledge of the domestic trade laws to the process,
which should result in high quality decisions based solidly upon the
domestic law applicable to the proceeding. 79
The last procedure permitted by the FTA is the review of statutory
amendments of either country's unfair trade laws (especially the
antidumping and countervailing duty statutes) by five-member binational
panels under article 1903.80 Such panels are to issue declaratory opin-
ions on whether the amendments are consistent with the GATT and the
FTA. 8' The panel may recommend modifications of a non-conforming
statute which the parties will then discuss in consultations.' Proce-
dures to guide the panel's confidential deliberations over a ninety-day
period are provided in article 1903.2. 3 This procedure has not been
utilized by either party.
" Decision, April 8, 1993. Copies are available from the Binational Secretariat. See also
Extraordinary Challenge Committee Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 53212 (1988), amended and republished
in 59 Fed. Reg. 5910 (1994).
876 Gary H. Horlick, The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and GA7T Disputes Settlement
Procedures, the Litigant's View, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1992).
in Id.
I Id. at 11.
7 Lowenfeld, supra note 152. See generally Horlick, supra note 176 at 10.
8W FTA, supra note 12, art. 1903. See also FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 445.
' FTA, supra note 12, art. 1904; FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 446.
1 FrA, supra note 12, art. 1903.1; FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 446.
8 FTA, supra note 12, art. 1903.2; FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 446.
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C. NAFTA General Provisions
The United States and Mexico signed a framework agreement in
1987, leading to the negotiation of a free trade agreement four years
later. On August 12, 1992, the Governments of the United States of
America, the United Mexican States, and Canada completed negotiations
on the proposed NAFTA. A final text was signed on December 17,
1992."8 After a bitter fight in Congress, all three nations developed
implementing legislation and regulations to permit entry into force of the
NAFTA on January 1, 199 4 .t" The agreement will be more compre-
hensive than the FTA, including elimination of many tariffs on the date
of entry into force and all remaining tariffs within five, ten, or fifteen
years, "'86 depending upon the sensitivity of the industry or sector. The
agreement addresses rules of origin to ensure that only the three parties
benefit from the agreement.' Trade in goods will be facilitated by
significant improvements in market access and extension of most favored
nation treatment beyond the national level to provincial and state mea-
sures, a significant expansion of rights beyond the MFN obligation of
GATT.' Significant commitments by the parties to control customs
administration will ensure compliance with the rules of origin and help
guarantee that market access commitments are enforced."9
Special rules will govern such sensitive sectors as textiles and ap-
parel,"9  agriculture,' 9' energy and basic petrochemicals, 92  as well
as automotive goods.9 The NAFTA also includes significant provi-
sions affecting trade in services,"9 financial services,9" invest-
ment,'96  government procurement, 97  technical standards, 198
28 NAFTA, supra, note 9.
's See, Trade Agreement Negotiation Authority of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1126 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2902-2903 (1991) (extending fast track authority).
'9 NAFTA, supra note 9, annex 302.2.
'" NAFTA, supra note 9, ch. 4.
8 NAFTA, supra note 9, annex 201.1. See chapter 3, National Treatment and Market Access
for Goods for other specific commitments concerning such market access matters as user fees,
duty drawback, and temporary entry of goods.
i Id. ch. 5.
'~ Id. annex 300-B.
292 Id. ch. 7.
... Id. ch. 6.
.. Id. 300-A.
4 Id. ch. 12.
195 Id. ch. 14.
'9 Id. ch. 11.
'9 Id. ch. 10.
tnId. ch. 9.
5591993]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L[.
phytosanitary regulations, 99  telecommunications,00  competition poli-
cy,2°1 temporary entry of business persons,' intellectual property, 3
emergency actions (safeguards),2 4 the environment, 25  and includes
dispute settlement provisions modeled on the FTA.2°
The FTA will be suspended except that some chapters are incorpo-
rated by reference into NAFTA. The U.S. and Canadian governments
have exchanged letters to permit chapter 19 to remain in effect as to all
active panel disputes and extraordinary challenge proceedings flowing
from those disputes. In addition, the Parties agreed to abide by the FTA
as to certain matters under chapter 18, article 401, annex 401.6, and
annex 1404(A).
D. NAFTA Dispute Settlement Provisions
The NAFTA dispute settlement provisions closely parallel the provi-
sions of the U.S.-Canada FTA, but also offer several innovations in the
areas of investment and environmental issues.27
Chapter 19 of the NAFTA provides for review of antidumping and
countervailing duty final determinations by panels of experts drawn from
an agreed roster developed by the signatories.0 8 The roster shall in-
clude sitting or retired judges to the fullest extent possible, a departure
from the FTA, where most of the roster has been composed of lawyers
familiar with or practicing international trade law. The time limitations
imposed by article 1906 of the FTA are eliminated in the NAFTA.
A new process for safeguarding the panel review system has been
added to chapter 19 to permit review by three-member special commit-
1 Id. ch. 7, sec. B.
° Id. ch. 13.
lId. ch. 15.
Id. ch. 16.
Id. ch. 17.
I d. ch. 8.
I d. ch. 1.
See id. chs. 19-20; Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement,
prepared by the Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of
America, Aug. 12, 1992 (on file with the U.S. Trade Representative).
For a comprehensive review of NAFTA dispute settlement see, Gary N. Horlick and F. A.
DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Building on the FTA, GATT and ICSID, J. WORLD
TRADE, Feb. 1993.
' See NAFTA, supra note 9. annex 1901.2. See also Article 1904 Panel Rules, 59 Fed.
Reg. 8686 (1994). For an analysis of the pre-NAFTA state of the unfair trade laws in Mexico
and the U.S., see Stephen J. Powell et al., Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Talks, 11 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 177 (1990).
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tees of allegations of one party that another has interfered in the proper
functioning of the panel system.' ° If a special committee makes an
affirmative finding, the parties will either negotiate a solution or the
complaining party may suspend the operation of the chapter, subject to
retaliatory suspension by the offending party.
The extraordinary challenge procedures of the FTA, discussed su-
pra, have also been included in the NAIFTA with two important chang-
es.210 The first change affects one of the grounds for bringing a chal-
lenge, i.e. a panel decision may be challenged if, "the panel manifestly
exceeded it powers, authority or jurisdiction set fourth in this Article,
for example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of review.' '..
This inclusion of an example of the type of error for which a panel
decision may be challenged could help clarify the intent of the parties in
future disputes and ensure the appropriate application of the challenge
procedure. The second change is procedural, lengthening the time for the
issuance of committee decisions from 30 days to 90 days. 2
The general dispute settlement provisions provided in chapter 20 of
the NAFTA closely track chapter 18 of the FTA, but expand the scope
of action somewhat."3 Chapter 20 creates a Free Trade Commission to
oversee the implementation, elaboration, and operation of the agreement,
including resolution of disputes and supervision of all committees and
working groups created under the agreement.2"4 The Secretariat which
administers the panel review system will become a permanent, trilateral
organization with slightly broader authority to assist the Commission. 5
An important addition to NAFTA is an article authorizing the par-
ties to use alternative dispute settlement mechanisms including good
offices, conciliation, mediation, and expert advice.2"6 Another improve-
ment over the FTA is the addition of scientific review boards which
may be convened by panels or the parties to provide written reports on
factual issues to assist panels in rendering decisions.2 7 These panels
will be particularly important in the environmental area because such
issues will be reviewable under chapter 20.
' See, NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1905. See also Article 1905 Special Committee Rules, 59
Fed. Reg. 8714 (1994).
210 NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 1904. See also Extraordinary Challenge Committee Rules, 54
Fed. Reg. 8702 (1994).
211 NAFIA, supra note 9, art. 1904.13(a)(iii) (emphasis added).
212 See id. annex 1904.13(2).
21 Id. ch. 20.
214 Id. art. 20-1.
"I Id. art. 20-1.
216 Id. art. 20-5 to 20-7.
217 Id. art. 20-11.
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Other changes from the FTA include the addition of financial ser-
vices issues, under article 1415, which were excluded from binational
panel review in the FTA, within the coverage of chapter 20 .2" In ad-
dition, binding arbitration, provided by article 1806 of the FTA but
never utilized by the parties, has been eliminated from the NAFrA.
2
'
9
Reverse panel selection is provided for in article 2011 in that the disput-
ing parties each select two members of a panel from the other country
and the chair is decided jointly and may be from the third NAFFA part-
ner.
220
Article 707 creates an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial
Disputes regarding Agricultural Goods to provide recommendations for
the development of systems for the prompt and effective resolution of
phytosanitary and other agricultural disputes. Article 2022 creates a simi-
lar Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes.
There are some exceptions to the chapter 20 dispute settlement
mechanisms. The most important are the chapter 19 system for review
of AD/CVD determinations discussed supra and the provisions of chap-
ter 11 on investor-state discussed infra. In addition, chapter 5 provides
for review and appeal of determinations of origin and advance customs
rulings by at least one level of administrative officials above the official
making the ruling or determination, followed by judicial or quasi-judicial
review under the domestic law of the importing Party of the administra-
221tive review.
Another exception is contained in article 804 which provides that,
"no Party may request the establishment of an arbitral panel under Arti-
cle 2008 (Request For an Arbitral Panel) regarding any proposed emer-
gency action." This provision does not, however, exclude the formation
of a panel after an action has been taken to adjudicate the proprietary of
the action and its nullification or impairment of benefits conferred under
the agreement, nor does it prevent consultations and the formation of
expert groups by the Commission to assist in reviewing the process of
finding injury and safeguard matters regarding emergency action.
As in the FTA, the regulation of government procurement'm es-
tablishes a bid challenge procedure which is expected to function inde-
pendently from the chapter 20 system.'m Provision is made in article
1016(3) for the retention of reports by procuring entities for use by the
2. See id. art. 14-10.
219 F'A, supra note 12, art. 1806; FTA ANNOTATED, supra note 151, at 433.
' See NAFTA, supra note 9, at 20-8 to 20-9.
221 Id. art. 5-10.
'n Id. art. 8-4.
2'3 Id. art. 10-17.
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parties, if necessary, under chapter 20, indicating that the procurement
process and bid challenge system as applied by the Parties may be re-
viewed by panels.
The NAFTA does not permit dispute settlement panels to review
individual determinations made by the appropriate authorities under
chapter 16, relating to temporary entry for business persons. 4 Howev-
er, it may be possible for a Party to request a panel under article 2007
on behalf of an individual business person who has exhausted adminis-
trative remedies in such matters and can allege a pattern of practice by
the competent authority.'
Chapter 11 on investment sets up a separate arbitral mechanism
with reference to the World Bank's International Centre for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 26 and the Rules of the United
Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL
Rules), 7 for the arbitration of investment disputes between a party
and an investor of another party. However, disputes concerning the oper-
ation of Chapter 11 are probably reviewable under article 2007. Chapter
11 will help ameliorate the effects of the Calvo Doctrine, which has
served as an impediment to investment in Mexico and much of Latin
America.'
The Calvo Doctrine is embodied in article 27 of the Mexican Con-
stitution and various laws of the United Mexican States. 9 The doc-
trine provides that foreigners are not entitled to any rights or privileges
that are not available to the nationals of a country. Therefore, foreigners
must submit any claims involving property in a country, or transactions
"2 Id. arts. 10-16(3), 16-6.
n d.
' Convention on Multilateral Settlement of Investment Disputes, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.17, at 34, U.N. Doc A/31/17 (1976).
28 For a brief analysis of the efficacy of ICSID dispute settlement, see Horlick & DeBusk,
supra, note 207.
an Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution provides:
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican corporations have the
right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and the appurtenances, or to
obtain concessions for working mines or for the utilization of waters or
mineral fuel in the Republic of Mexico. The nation may grant the same
rights to aliens, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations
to consider themselves Mexicans in respect to such property, and bind them-
selves not to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating
thereto, under penalty, in the case of noncompliance, of forfeiture of the
property so acquired.
Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicans, art. 27 (1976). See generally DONALD R.
SHEA, THE CALvo CLAUSE 5-6 (1955).
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in that country, to the jurisdiction of its national courts and waive pro-
tection of their own country's laws.
The Calvo Doctrine has been accepted in most Latin American
jurisdictions and has acted as an, impediment to business transactions,
investment, and commercial relationships for many years." However,
both chapter 11 and article 2022 of the NAFTA encourage the use of
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution for international commercial
disputes, which may indicate an improved outlook for the settlement of
disputes through arbitration and other accepted international norms and
mechanisms."3
Another significant departure from the FTA in NAFTA is the cre-
ation of an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes to help
the parties, "encourage and facilitate the use of arbitration and other
means of alternative dispute resolution for the settlement of international
commercial disputes between private parties in the free trade area." 2
Article 2022 specifically references the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (known as
the New York Convention), 3 and the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, which may significantly assist new
exporters from all three nations to include appropriate arbitration clauses
in contracts with NAFTA customers, avoiding lengthy and expensive
judicial procedures to enforce contract rights, and to obtain binding
decisions under the treaties from qualified and impartial arbitrators. 4
Some key questions remain about the potential clash of the applica-
tion of civil law by panelists from a common law tradition and vice
versa. In the modern world of law and business, this problem should not
become a major impediment to the success of this mechanism, since
many lawyers practicing in the area of international trade are familiar
with commercial law in both civil and common law jurisdictions. For
example, lawyers in Louisiana and Quebec have successfully juggled the
competing demands of two systems of law, so this is not an insur-
mountable problem. Lawyers are likely to have sufficient background
and experience to properly apply the law of any party to a dispute aris-
ing under the agreement. Whether the proper application of the
' See generally James W. Weller, Note, International Parties, Breach of Contract, and the
Recovery of Future Profits, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 323 (1987).
"3 NAFTA, supra note 9, ch. 11, art. 20-22.
23 Id. art. 20-2.
"' Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1959, 21 U.S.T. 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; P.L. 91-368; 9 U.S.C. 201-208 (1970).
' Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, SEN.
TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, O.A.S.T.S. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336. The United States became a signatory
to this agreement on Oct. 27, 1990.
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AD/CVD statutes will create special problems remains to be seen, par-
ticularly because Mexico must create new systems to comply with treaty
obligations.
This set of mechanisms appears to be well-suited to substantially
improve the business climate throughout the Latin American and Carib-
bean region as other governments seek to accede to the hemispheric free
trade regime envisioned in the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
The NAFTA appears to go farther toward promoting objective, quasi-
judicial, rigorous, and enforceable mechanisms for trade dispute resolu-
tion than any other agreement. It will serve as the standard against
which other systems are measured for the foreseeable future.
V. U.S. TRADE INITIATIVES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Seizing on the liberalization trends in the region, President Bush
announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EA) on June 27,
1990."5 The EAI reflected the Administration's interest in finding
ways for many LAC countries to manage their international debt bur-
dens and to provide an alternative to drug-reliant economies.
The stated objective of EAI was to strengthen LAC economies
through the three "pillars" of support for trade liberalization, assistance
in creating open investment climates, and reduction of official debt to
the United States. The EAI promised market access, financial and tech-
nical resources, and debt reduction opportunities to countries that lib-
eralized their trade and investment regimes, maintained sound economic
policies conducive to investment and competition, and managed their
international debt obligations responsibly.
The announcement stated that the ultimate goal of the initiative was
the conclusion of various bilateral and plurilateral agreements "to estab-
lish a free trade zone from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego.' ' " This
element, while only a long-term strategy objective, marked a significant
departure from the unilateral preference approach that otherwise has
characterized U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean.237 It
2"5 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1992 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 1991
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PRO-
GRAM 29 (1992) (on file at office of the U.S. Trade Representative). See also President Bush's
address on "Enterprises for the Americas" Proposal and Accompanying White House Fact Sheet,
Released June 27, 1990, DAILY REP. EXECUTIVES (BNA) DER No. 125, at M-I, (June 28, 1990).
EAI Brochure, supra note 6.
27 Both the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), first proposed in 1982 by President Reagan,
and the Andean Trade Initiative (ATI), announced in 1990, are unilateral trade preference pro-
grams intended to stimulate investment and diversify the export bases of developing countries in
the hemisphere. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2707 (1983), (CBI's authorizing legislation providing for certain permanent unilateral and prefer-
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has provided the greatest incentive to countries in the region to liber-
alize their economies and hasten their own regional integration efforts.
On numerous occasions President Clinton expressed his commitment
of expanding hemispheric free trade. He has talked about his desire to
develop deeper trading links with all the democracies and free market
economies in the region. In his remarks to the Wall Street Journal last
October, Clinton stated that, "plainly NAFTA could lead the way to a
new partnership with Chile, with Argentina, with Colombia, with Vene-
zuela, with a whole range of countries in Latin America who have em-
braced democracy and market economics.""
The process for entering into free trade agreements is currently
under review. In theory., there are several possibilities for concluding
such an agreement, including accession to the present NAFTA, negotiat-
ing bilateral agreements, or a plurilateral agreement with a regional
grouping. Several recent press reports indicate that the U.S. government
has not reached a consensus on what path to follow. 9
The NAFTA Implementation Act requires the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to report to Congress by May 1, 1994, countries that have made
progress in opening their markets to U.S. markets and the further open-
ing of whose markets has the greatest potential to increase U.S. exports.
Based on that report, the President must report by July 1, 1994, to Con-
gress the countries with which the U.S. should seek to negotiate free
trade agreements.
If free trade agreements are negotiated with other LAC countries,
the U.S. will probably demand a minimum package of commitments
reflected in the NAFTA. Aside from the elimination of all tariffs and
non-tariff barriers to trade in the area, the package would need to in-
clude provisions on insurance, investment, government procurement,
intellectual property rights protection and enforcement, and investment in
natural resources and resource-based products. Operational, technical, and
security rules such as dispute settlement provisions, rules of origin, pub-
lic health and safety standards, safeguards, and restraints on government
ential trade and tax measures for 24 eligible Caribbean Basin countries and territories). The cen-
terpiece of the ATI, the Andean Trade Preference Act, went into effect on December 4, 1991,
for a period of ten years and greatly resembles the CBERA. It applies to Colombia, Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru. Both programs provide exceptions to duty free treatment for articles of signif-
icant export interest to many countries in the region: textile and apparel products, petroleum,
canned tuna, footwear, certain leather goods, and certain watches and watch parts. Andean Trade
Preference Act of 1991, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (1992) [hereinafter ATPA].
' President Bill Clinton, Remarks to the Wall Street Journal's Annual Conference on the
Americas (Oct. 28, 1993), in FED. NEws SERVICE, Oct. 29, 1993 (available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File).
29 See INSIDE NAF'A, Jan. 12, 1994, Jan. 26, 1994, and Feb. 3, 1994.
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actions such as subsidies, state trading, balance of payments restrictions,
and use of foreign exchange restrictions and controls will also be neces-
sary.24 Finally, the issues of environment and worker's rights will also
need to be addressed.
The U.S. Government has indicated generally what factors will be
considered in determining which countries meet the appropriate condi-
tions to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States. A
country or group of countries would be expected to have the institution-
al capacity to fulfill the long-term, serious commitments involved; to be
committed to a stable macro-economic environment and market-oriented
policies before negotiations begin; and to show commitment to the mul-
tilateral trading system." Another indication of a country's willingness
to seriously undertake the extensive reforms necessary for expanding
free trade is respect and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR)
legislation.
In the meantime, pursuant to EAI, the U.S. has signed seventeen
framework agreements on trade and investment, fourteen bilateral and
two regional, covering thirty-two countries: Colombia,242 Ecuador, 3
Chile,2' Honduras,24  Costa Rica,246  Venezuela, 7  El Salvador,248
Peru,249  Panama,250  Nicaragua,25' Guatemala,252  the South
See EAI Brochure, supra note 5.
' See EM brochure, supra note 9.
42 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Columbia Concerning a United States-Columbia Joint Commission on Trade and Investment,
July 17, 1990 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Ecuador Concerning a United States-Ecuador Council on Trade and Investment, July 1990 (on
file at U.S. Trade Representative).
2 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Chile Concerning a United States-Chile Council on Trade and Investment,
Oct. 1, 1990 (on file at U.S. Trade Representative).
243 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Honduras Concerning a United States-Honduras Council on Trade and Invest-
ment, Nov. 1, 1990 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Costa Rica Concerning a United States-Costa Rica Council on Trade and
Investment, Nov. 29, 1990 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
24 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Venezuela Concerning a United States-Venezuela Council on Trade and In-
vestment, Apr. 8, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
us Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of El Salvador Concerning a United States-El Salvador Council on Trade and
Investment, May 13, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
" Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Peru Concerning a United States-Peru Council on Trade and Investment, May 16, 1991 (on
file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
"' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
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American Common Market (MERCOSUR: Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
Paraguay), 3 the Caribbean Common Market (Caricom: Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Ja-
maica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago),' the Dominican Republic,"5
and Surinam. 6  Mexico" and Bolivia 5  had signed framework
agreements before EAI was announced. Thus, the U.S. has framework
agreements in place with all LAC countries except Haiti and Cuba.
The framework agreements are generally similar. Each establishes a
Trade and Investment Council (TIC), and the annex to each describes
the immediate action agenda of trade and investment issues, which var-
ies by country. Private sector consultations are encouraged. While the
agenda and frequency of the TIC meetings are currently under review
and subject to change in the post-NAFTA environment, in the past the
TICs have met at least annually at mutually agreed upon times and
locations. Their objective was to exchange information on trade and
investment relations, to hold consultations on specific issues, and to
work toward removing impediments to trade and investment flows.
While either side can raise any issue for consultation, the frameworks
do not bind signatories to implement specific trade liberalization com-
mitments.
of the Republic of Panama Concerning a United States-Panama Council on Trade and Investment,
June 27, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
"' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Nicaragua Concerning a United States-Nicaragua Council on Trade and Invest-
ment, June 27, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
"3 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Guatemala Concerning a United States-Guatemala Council on Trade and In-
vestment, Oct. 2, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
253 Agreement Among the Governments of the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of
Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning a Council on Trade and Investment, June 1991 (on file at
the U.S. Trade Representative).
' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Caribbean
Community (Caricom) Concerning a United States-Caricom Council on Trade and Investment July
27, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
5 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Dominican
Republic Concerning a United States-Dominican Republic Council on Trade and Investment, Dec.
13, 1991 (on file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
' Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and Surinam Con-
cerning a United States-Surinam Council on Trade and Investment, Sept. 1, 1993 (on file at the
U.S. Trade Representative).
2 Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.- Mex., SEN. TREATY Doc. No. 13, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988).
" Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Republic of
Bolivia Concerning a United States-Bolivia Council on Trade and Investment May 8, 1990 (on
file at the U.S. Trade Representative).
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In practice, the TICs have focused on such specific issues as tariff
treatment of agricultural and industrial products, technical standards, and
intellectual property rights. They have also served as fora to discuss
loosely defined criteria for free trade agreements and to coordinate
countries' GAIT strategies and positions."
There are no specific dispute settlement mechanisms outlined in
these agreements, but the consultation provisions and regular meetings of
the Trade and Investment Councils provide an enhanced opportunity for
LAC countries to engage in constructive dialogue to reduce trade ten-
sions. These framework agreements serve as vehicles for opening mar-
kets and developing closer ties. They are perceived as stepping stones to
hemispheric free trade." ° However, many countries are-not politically
or economically prepared for entering into free trade negotiations for
some time due to the inability to undertake the comprehensive reforms
necessary to negotiate such agreements. In the meantime, these agree-
ments serve as forums for reducing trade and investment barriers and
resolving trade irritants through discussion and cooperation.
In a remarkable reversal of policy, due at least in part to these
trade initiations, several LAC countries have moved to sign bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) with the United States. BITs are in force with
Argentina, Grenada, Panama, Ecuador, and Jamaica, and a signed (but
not yet ratified) agreement exists with Haiti. As of January 1994, the
U.S. was holding active negotiations with Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colom-
bia, Venezuela, and Chile. Serious talks with other LAC countries have
also taken place. BITs extend national treatment to foreign investment,
proscribe performance requirements, free investment-related transfers, set
forth recognized standards of international law for expropriations, and,
especially important in the LAC, grant investors access to international
arbitration through such international bodies as the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
LAC countries' willingness to negotiate BITs with the U.S. is an
indication of the extent to which their outlook on investment by foreign
companies has changed. The Argentine government's signing of a BIT
with the U.S. in 1991 was historic. Agreeing to submit disputes with
foreign investors to international arbitration amounted to a renunciation
of the Calvo Doctrine of sovereignty 6' in its nation of origin, and
generally is consistent with LAC countries' increasing disposition to re-
solve international disputes through referral to third parties.
EAI Brochure, supra note 6.
Id.
• For a discussion of the Calvo clause see SHEA. supra note 229.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The current climate of liberalization and the rapid expansion of free
trade areas and customs unions throughout the Americas requires effi-
cient, fair, and accessible mechanisms for the adjudication and final
resolution of disputes. A shift is underway from dispute management
and conflict avoidance through consultative mechanisms and negotiations
to more binding systems involving third party intercession or use of
nongovernmental experts to assist the parties to trade agreements to
settle difficult issues.
The next decade will see continued expansion of the global rules
governing trade through the Uruguay Round. The more rapid, certain,
and enforceable mechanisms established by the FTA, NAFTA, or the
Mexico-Chile PTA should result in more stable trading environments in
the Western Hemisphere. Within that global framework, the preferential
programs of developed countries, such as GSP and CBI, may become
irrelevant as duties fall in response to expanding regional integration and
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
The integration of Latin American economies and the probability of
coordinated economic and trade policies will likely result in increasingly
potent negotiating power. This, in turn, may result in a continuing series
of treaties to foster international trade in the region. With improved
market access for goods and services from each country to all other
countries in the region, improved rules for investment, and better protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, the overall business climate is likely
to continue to improve in the hemisphere. The expansion of trade and
business relationships will foster a self-reinforcing need for improved
dispute settlement systems which are efficient, impartial, speedy, and
enforceable.
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